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The effects of refugee and non-refugee immigrants on US trade
with their home countries
Roger Whitea* and Bedassa Tadesseb
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Employing data on US immigrants and trade with 59 home countries for
the years 1996–2001, we compare the extent to which refugee and non-
refugee immigrants affect US trade with their home countries and
provide the first evidence of variation in the US immigrant–trade
relationship across immigrant types. We also consider the abilities of
refugee and non-refugee immigrants to offset the trade-inhibiting
influence of cultural distance. Our results show that while immigrants,
in general, exert positive influences on US imports from – and exports
to – their home countries, the influence of refugee immigrants is quite
minimal when compared with that of non-refugee immigrants. For both
immigrant types, however, evidence supporting the notion that
immigrants act to offset cultural distance is observed. To conceptualize
the economic meaning of our results, we provide estimates of the extent
to which each type of immigrants offset transport costs.
Keywords: cultural distance; gravity; immigrants; networks; refugees;
trade
1. Introduction
Starting with Gould (1994), who first documents an immigrant–trade link
using US data, a voluminous literature has been published detailing the
influences of immigrants on trade for various host countries. More recent
studies (Mundra 2005; Tadesse and White 2010a; White 2007a, 2009)
confirm the pro-trade influences of immigrants for the US and document
that the effect of immigrants on US–home country trade is sensitive to
cultural, institutional and economic differences between the US and the
immigrants’ home countries. Yet, little attention has been paid to examining
whether the influence of immigrants on US–home country trade varies by
immigrants’ entry classifications. As the extent to which immigrants
influence trade is generally sensitive to their anthropogenic characteristics,
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which may differ by entry classification, examining variation in the
immigrant-trade link across immigrant types may provide new insights
into the channels through which the link is assumed to operate. It also
fosters a better understanding of the roles that different types of immigrants
play in influencing their host-home country commercial relationships and
may benefit the formulation of appropriate social policy. In fact, the
ongoing debates over US immigration and trade policies also underscore the
importance of garnering a complete understanding of the topic. Our work
augments the literature by contrasting immigrant–trade links between two
broad, yet distinct, immigrant categories: immigrants admitted as refugees
and asylum-seekers (hereafter generalized as ‘refugees’) and immigrants
admitted under the guise of filling labor market vacancies, diversity
promotion, and family reunification, etc (hereafter ‘non-refugees’).
Immigrants, generally, are thought to influence trade between their host
and home countries in a variety of ways that have been categorized into two
broad channels. First, they may increase host country imports from their
respective home countries if they arrive with strong preferences for home
country goods and find neither the desired products nor reasonable
substitutes available. White (2007a) refers to this channel as ‘transplanted
home bias’. Second, immigrants may have knowledge of home country
markets that, if exploited, could increase trade flows. Dunlevy (2006)
describes this channel as the ‘information bridge hypothesis’, while
Greenaway et al. (2007) presents this channel as involving both a ‘cultural
bridge’ and an ‘enforcement bridge’, each of which utilizes immigrants’
knowledge of home country customs and business practices, language
abilities, or understanding of complex informal contracting structures to
reduce the asymmetry of information arising from cultural and, hence,
institutional differences, thereby increasing trade flows. Likewise, through
their connections to home country business or social networks, immigrants
may affect trade if their connections facilitate transmission of information
regarding business opportunities or deter opportunistic behavior, perhaps
through a form of reputation-enforcement (Rauch and Watson 2002; Rauch
and Trindade 2002; and Rauch 1999, 2001). As noted, the analysis of
whether refugee and non-refugee immigrants’ use of these abilities equally
affects host-home country trade may have important policy implications.
To meet our objective, we employ US immigrant and trade data with 59
home countries that span the years 1996–2001. Historically, the US has
accepted relatively diverse and large numbers of immigrants; however,
passage of the several pieces of legislation – most notably, the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1965 – transformed the basis for immigrant entry by
granting priority to immigrants based on family reunification, filling
vacancies in the labor market, and permitting entrance of refugees and
asylum-seekers, thus changing the composition of subsequent immigrant
inflows.1 Refugees, as set forth in the Act, are immigrants who are unable or
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unwilling to return to their home countries due to persecution or a well-
founded fear that, upon return, they may face persecution due to their race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership(s) in a particular
social group(s). Non-refugee immigrants, for our purpose, are those
admitted to the country to fill labor market vacancies, for family
reunification or as part of the diversity lottery. To provide an indication
of the relative magnitudes of refugee and non-refugee immigrant inflows,
approximately 3.6 million of the more than 28.5 million documented
immigrants who arrived in the US during the 1946–2001 period were
classified as refugees. This not inconsequential number of refugee arrivals is
equivalent to 12.6% of the observed inflow of immigrants during this period
(United States Department of Homeland Security 2004; United States
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service 1960–2001;
United Sates Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1951).
The potential differences in the abilities of refugee and non-refugee
immigrants to affect US–home country trade can be attributed to two
general facets. First, most refugee immigrants arrive in the US after
spending a considerable number of years in a third country and, in the
process, may adapt their tastes and preferences to consumption of goods
and services available in the countries that embraced them during their
transition. Thus, the extent to which, through their transplanted home bias
effects, refugee immigrants affect US trade with their home countries may
differ from those of non-refugee immigrants, who often arrive in the US
directly from their home countries. Second, the extent to which, through
their cultural bridge and network effects, non-refugee immigrants affect US
trade with their home countries may differ from those of refugee immigrants
as the latter have tenuous ties to their home countries and may face
difficulties, due to fears that those in their networks may face persecution, in
using their network connections to conduct transactions. These reasons give
rise to our three working hypotheses: first, that the effect of non-refugee
immigrants on US imports is greater than that of refugee immigrants.
Second, given that refugees have limited abilities to maintain/foster
connections with their home country-based trading partners, we hypothesize
that they are also less influential in increasing US exports to their home
countries through their cultural and enforcement bridge effects. While these
hypotheses provide reasonable grounds to expect differences in the extent to
which refugee and non-refugee immigrants might influence US trade with
their home countries, as mentioned earlier, to date no research has examined
such differences. Third, suggestive of greater roles that immigrants could
play than have been discussed in the literature, recent studies indicate that
immigrants partially offset the effects of cultural distance on their host
country’s trade with their home countries (Tadesse and White 2010a, 2010b;
White and Tadesse 2009). Based on the findings from these studies and the
observation that, compared with typical non-refugee immigrants, refugee
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immigrants are less connected to their home country, we also hypothesize
that the abilities of refugee and non-refugee immigrants to counter any
associated trade-inhibiting influences of cultural distance differ from one
another; again, this is a further elaboration of the emphasis of most recent
studies that examine the immigrant–trade link.
Results from our study indicate that while immigrants exert positive
influences on US imports from and exports to their home countries, the
influence of refugees on US trade with their home countries is quite minimal
when compared with that of non-refugee immigrants. For both immigrant
types, our findings support the notion that immigrants act to offset cultural
distance; with the related effects of non-refugee immigrants being stronger
than those of refugees. To conceptualize our results, we estimate each
immigrant type’s ability to offset transport costs (as represented by geodesic
distance). Our findings indicate the importance of accounting for immigrant
types when undertaking empirical analysis involving the immigrant–trade
link while implying the need for more detailed analysis of immigrant
characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related
literature. Section 3 presents the empirical specification, while Section 4
details both the data and the variable construction. Estimation results are
discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Review of the immigrant–trade link literature
As mentioned at the outset, evidence of a robust positive relationship
between immigrants and host–home country trade has been reported for
several home countries. Following Gould (1994), pro-trade immigrant
influences have been documented for Canada (Helliwell 1997; Head and
Ries 1998; Wagner et al. 2002), Greece (Piperakis et al. 2003), Malaysia
(Hong and Santhapparaj 2006), New Zealand (Bryant et al. 2004), and
Spain (Blanes 2003, 2006; Blanes and Martin-Montaner 2006). Examining
Canada–Taiwan trade, Ching and Chen (2000) also find evidence of pro-
trade immigrant effects. Similarly, Greenaway et al. (2007) and Rauch and
Trindade (2002) employ Chinese population shares to represent the presence
of ethnic Chinese networks and report that such networks increase bilateral
trade flows. Studies conducted using US state-level export data also report
pro-export immigrant effects (Co et al. 2004; Bardhan and Guhathakurta
2005; Herander and Saavedra 2005; Dunlevy 2006; Tadesse and White 2007;
and Bandyopadhyay et al. 2008). Examining intra-France trade, Combes
et al. (2005) report a pro-trade influence of migrants. Finally, Blanes (2005)
for Spain and White (2008) for the US report that immigrants exert positive
influences on intra-industry trade.
Several other studies examine variation in the immigrant–trade link
across home countries and product classifications. White (2007a) reports
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that the US immigrant–trade link is driven by immigrants from relatively
low-income countries. Considering the influence of immigrants on US–home
country trade across product classifications, Rauch (1999) and Mundra
(2005) find that immigrants exert stronger pro-trade effects on differentiated
products. Allowing for variation in the effects of immigrants on trade across
home country income classifications and Rauch (1999) product classifica-
tions, White (2009) concludes that the links are weakest for US exports of
homogeneous products to high-income countries and strongest for US
imports of differentiated products from low-income countries. Examining
Danish data, White (2007b), however, reports a different result: immigrant–
trade links are greatest in magnitude for trade in differentiated products
with high-income immigrant countries, and weakest, yet positive, for trade
in homogeneous products with low-income immigrant countries. Further,
less variation was found, across product types and home country
income classifications, in the Danish immigrant–trade link relative to the
US case. White suggests the differences in findings may be attributable to
the relative homogeneity of the Danish population, relative to the US
population, which could foster an increased ability for immigrants from all
home country classifications to increase trade via preferences for unavailable
home country products or through their connections to home country
networks.
Using UK data and stratifying their sample of home countries by
‘commonwealth’ or ‘non-commonwealth’ affiliation, Girma and Yu (2002)
report pro-trade influences for immigrants in the latter classification and
attribute the differences in immigrants’ effects on trade to institutional
dissimilarities between the UK and non-commonwealth countries. Indirectly
testing Girma and Yu’s conclusion, White and Tadesse (2007) classify
Australian immigrants’ home countries by their access to preferential
treatment (in terms of immigrant entry, assisted migration, etc) under the
White Australia policy, and consider whether Australia’s abandonment of
the policy led to subsequent variation in immigrant–trade links. The authors
report that immigrants from nations not afforded preference under the
policy exert stronger proportional influences on Australian imports, while
those from nations afforded preference exert stronger influences on exports
and propose that the observed variation may stem from the home country’s
cultural dissimilarities with Australia. Despite these evidences, which imply
the influence of immigrants on home–host country trade is immigrant-
specific (i.e. individual abilities and home country characteristics), neither of
these studies nor that of Herander and Saavedra (2005), which reports
significant differences between the effects of immigrants who reside in a
given state and those who reside in other states on US state-level exports to
the immigrants’ home countries, consider entry classification (which may
encompass both immigrant-specific and immigrant home country attributes)
as a potential source for the observed variation.
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 293
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The only study that has considered variation in immigrant–trade links
across entry classifications is that of Head and Ries (1998). Employing trade
and immigration data for Canada and 136 immigrant home countries for the
years 1980–1992 and using five different immigrant entry classes: family
immigrants, refugees, independent immigrants, entrepreneurs and other
business classes (investors and the self-employed), the authors demonstrate
the existence of significant heterogeneity across entry classes in terms of the
influences of immigrants on Canada–home country trade. Refugees are
reported to have no significant influence on Canadian exports, although
they significantly increase Canadian imports. To the contrary, independent
immigrants are found to exert the strongest influence on Canadian trade.
Since such immigrants are selected using a points-based system that
considers educational attainment, occupational demand and other factors,
Head and Ries identify independent immigrants as likely to be more skilled;
thus explaining the relative strength of the observed pro-trade influence.
Family immigrants are also found to exert positive influences on both
imports and exports. Business and entrepreneur classes of immigrants exert
lesser, yet positive, influences on exports and positive, yet relatively weak,
influences on imports. While our data precludes such detailed analysis, we
are able to distinguish between immigrants who entered the US as refugees
(for humanitarian reasons) and those who entered as non-refugees (for
economic reasons, to fill labor market vacancies, as part of the diversity
lottery or for family creation/reunification). Further, we employ a relatively
new measure of US–home country cultural distance to capture the related
influences of cultural (dis)similarity on trade flows. This enables us to
consider variation in the immigrant–trade relationship across distinct
immigrant types while accounting for potential differences in their abilities
to offset the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural and institutional differences
and the effects of transportation costs as represented by geodesic distance.
3. Intuition and empirical specification
Following the lead of prior studies, we employ a variation of the standard
gravity specification.2 In its most simple derivation, the gravity specification
models trade between two countries i and j during year t ( ~Tijt) as an
increasing function of the trading partners’ combined economic mass
(YitYjt) and a decreasing function of transportation costs, usually
represented by geodesic distance (GDij). According to the model, intuitively,
higher home country GDP (Yjt) implies greater potential export markets for
host country i to serve and an increased probability that the host country
imports from home country j. Likewise, higher host country GDP (Yit)
signals a greater capacity to both export and import. Geodesic distance
(GDij), a proxy for transport costs, is measured as the distance between the
capital cities of host country i and each home country j and is expected to
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reduce trade. To capture the potential influence of host–home country
cultural dissimilarity, and the role immigrants might play in countering the
influence, we follow Tadesse and White (2010a) and augment the theoretical
model with the ratio of the immigrant stock from country j residing in
country i to the cultural distance between the immigrants’ host and home
countries (IMijt/CDijt). This ratio is included in X
f
ijt; a vector that contains
trade-facilitating/inhibiting factors that are often discussed in the literature.
Equation (1) illustrates.
~Tijt ¼ a
Y
b1
it Y
b2
jt
GD
g
1
ij
 !
X
f
ijt ð1Þ
Equation (1) postulates that while both geodesic distance between
immigrants’ host and home countries negatively affect trade, the extent to
which cultural distance affects trade may be influenced by the stock of
immigrants from home country j living in host country i. Adding an
identically and independently distributed and multiplicative error term, eijt,
makes the equation stochastic:
~Tijt ¼ a
Y
b1
it Y
b2
jt
GD
g
1
ij
 !
X
f
ijteijt ð2Þ
Expanding the vector X
f
ijt, and allowing a to be the constant of
proportionality, taking natural logarithms of the continuous variables on
both sides of the Equation (2), and including terms that interact immigrant
stock and cultural distance variables to capture the potential variation in the
influences of immigrants across relatively more (or less) culturally-distant
home countries, results in our empirical specification:
ln ~Tijt ¼ a0 þ l1 ln IMijt þ l2 lnCDijt þ l3ðln IMijt  lnCDijtÞ þ g1 lnGDij
þ f1D lnTijt1 þ f2 lnYjt þ f3 lnPOPjt þ f4D lnXRATEijt
þ f5 ln
Ydefjt
Ydefit
 
þ f6 lnOPENjt þ f7 lnREMjt þ f8ENGj
þ f9FTAij þ f10PORTj þ bOOt þ eijt ð3Þ
We begin our analysis by estimating Equation (3) without distinguishing
between refugee and non-refugee immigrants. We then distill the immigrant
stock variable into refugee immigrants (REF_IMijt) and non-refugee
immigrants (NREF_IMijt) and repeat the estimation. Finally, we decompose
our cultural distance variable into its component dimensions to facilitate
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more detailed analysis. A priori, we hypothesize that l1 4 0, l2 5 0 and
l3 4 0, and that once the immigrant stock variable is decomposed into
refugees and non-refugee immigrant cohorts, lNREF IM1 > l
REF IM
1  0, while
the coefficient on the cultural distance coefficient is expected to remain
negative.
4. Data and variable construction
Our vector of dependent variables includes aggregate US imports, exports
and disaggregated (manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors) import
and export values, each of which is regressed, in turn, on the set of
explanatory variables. All trade data are from the SourceOECD Database.
As the US is country i, corresponding GDP values (included in equations (1)
and (2)) do not vary across trading partners and their effects are subsumed
into coefficients on the time dummy variables. While several of our control
variables are standard, two of the variables are of primary interest to us and
warrant specific discussion. Next we provide a brief discussion of these two
variables before turning to the remaining control variables.
4.1. Refugees and non-refugee immigrant stocks
The US census provides country-level immigrant stock values for the years
1990 and 2000 (Gibson and Lennon 1999; US Census 2006). While
immigrant stock data are not available for the intra-census years, annual
immigrant inflow data for the years 1991–2001 are available from the US
Department of Homeland Security (2004). We generate immigrant stock
estimates for intra-census years by treating the census values as accurate and
employing the inflow data. Immigrant stocks for the years 1991–1999 are
thus estimated as IMijt ¼ ^IMijt1 þ
Pt
1991 INFijt þ dj, where ^IMijt1 is the
estimated immigrant stock from country j residing in the US during the year
immediately prior and dj is an adjustment factor accounting for return
migration and immigrant deaths that occur during intra-census years. The
adjustment factor is equal to the country j immigrant stock reported by the
2000 census less the sum of immigrants from that country in the US in 1990
and the inflow from that country during the years 1991–2000, divided by
ten: dj ¼

IMij2000 

IMij1990 þ
P2000
t¼1991 INFijt

=10. As the most recent
population census was taken in 2000, we cannot apply the same
interpolation technique to estimate immigrant stock values for the year
2001. We do, however, utilize the benchmark values provided by the 2000
census with the 2001 immigrant inflow data to estimate immigrant stock
values for the year 2001. Specifically, immigrant stock values for 2001 are
estimated as (IMij2001 ¼ (IMij2000 þ INFij2001)(1 þ dj/IMij2000). The corre-
sponding proportional adjustment is based on the adjustment factor derived
when estimating 1991–1999 immigrant stocks. Specifically, the adjustment is
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made using the percentage difference between raw 2000 immigrant stock
values and 2000 census values.
To estimate refugee immigrant stocks, we utilize inflow data for refugees
(REF_INFijt) and for other immigrants (NREF_IMijt) during the years
1946–1990 (DHS 2004; INS 1960–1977, 1978–2001) to first estimate the
1990 refugee stock:
REF IMij1990 ¼ IMij1990 
P1990
t¼1946
REF INijt
P1990
t¼1946
REF INFijt þNREF INFijt
 
The estimate of the non-refugee immigrant stock is given by NREF_
IMij1990 ¼ IMij19907REF_IMij1990. Estimated refugee and non-refugee im-
migrant stocks, for each non-census year during the 1991–2001 period, were
then constructed as REF_IMijt ¼ (REF_IMijt–1 þ REF_INFijt) 6 (1 þ dj/
IMij2000) and NREF_IMijt ¼ IMijt–REF_IMijt, where dj is as described
above. A combination of the 1991–1999 and 2001 immigrant stock estimates
with the 1990 and 2000 census values results in estimates of the refugee, non-
refugee immigrant and total immigrant stocks that span the years 1990–
2001. Due to our inability to compile complete series for some of the other
control variables for years early in the period, we restrict our study to the
years 1996–2001.
4.2. US–home country cultural distances
Following Tadesse and White (2010a), we estimate US–home country
cultural distances using data from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and the
European Values Surveys (EVS) (Inglehart et al. 2004; Hagenaars et al.
2003). The surveys provide data from representative national samples
and pertain to a broad and varying set of topics that includes
economics, politics, religion, sexual behavior, gender roles, family values,
communal identities, civic engagement, ethical concerns, environmental
protection, and scientific and technological progress (Inglehart et al. 2004).
Given the broad coverage of the topics on which the measure of cultural
distance is based, as mentioned, the variable also potentially reflects
institutional (dis)similarities between the US and the immigrants’ home
countries. Factor analysis is applied to classify respondents along two
dimensions of culture: Traditional authority versus Secular-Rational
authority (TSR) and Survival values versus Self-Expression values (SSE)
(Inglehart et al. 2004).3 We construct average TSR and SSE values for each
home country and estimate the US–home country cultural distance as
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CDijt ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
TSRjt  TSRit
 2þ SSEjt  SSEit 2q .4 Figure 1 illustrates differ-
ences across TSR and SSE dimensions and cultural distances for several
home countries.5
The TSR dimension of culture (vertical axis) reflects the contrast
between societies in which deference to the authority of a God, a nation or
the family is viewed as important or as an expectation (i.e. Traditional
societies) and those societies in which the individual and self-expression are
stressed (i.e. Secular-rational societies). Higher TSR values correspond to
greater emphasis on obedience to religious authority, national pride,
adherence to family/communal obligations, and norms of sharing. Members
of such societies tend to view large families and large numbers of children as
positive, or desirable, while divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide are
viewed in a very negative light. Members of Secular-rational societies tend to
hold opposing views on these topics, adhere to rational-legal norms, and
emphasize economic accumulation and individual achievement.
The SSE dimension of culture (horizontal axis) reflects differences
between societies that emphasize hard work and self-denial (Survival values)
and those that place greater emphasis on quality of life issues, such as
women’s emancipation and equal status for racial and sexual minorities
(Self-expression values). Societies in which individuals focus more on
survival tend to emphasize economic and physical security more than
autonomy. Generally, members of these societies find foreigners/outsiders,
ethnic diversity and cultural change to be threatening. This corresponds with
an intolerance of homosexuals and minorities, adherence to traditional
gender roles, and an authoritarian political outlook. Members of societies in
which Self-Expression values are emphasized tend to hold opposing
preferences on these issues.
Figure 1. Relative cultural distance from the United States, select countries listed.
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4.3. Additional control variables
The remaining explanatory variables in our empirical model include the
lagged first-difference of the dependent variable, and several other variables
(the change in the US–home country exchange rate, the US and immigrants’
home country GDP deflators, measures of economic remoteness and of
openness to trade) often included in the modified gravity model.6 While
Gould (1994) and Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) use one-year lagged values
of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable, interpreting their
specifications as partial adjustment models, following Wooldridge (2002),
we test for autocorrelation in similar specifications and find evidence of first-
order autocorrelation for each of our dependent variables. In the presence of
AR(1) in the data, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable would bias
estimated coefficients downward and potentially obscure any meaningful
effects of changes in explanatory variables, including those of immigrants,
on trade. Thus, to control for the influence of trade inertia, we include the
lagged first-difference of the dependent variable (given as D lnTijt71 ¼ ln
Tijt717lnTijt72) and employ the method of Random Effects Generalized
Least Squares. As changes in dependent variables are related to trends in
bilateral trade flows, rather than size or distance, the inclusion of this
variable does not violate the theoretical gravity equation in Equation (1),
nor bias the coefficient estimates downward.
We use annual changes in the US–home country exchange rate
(XRATEijt), given as home country currency units per US dollar, to
represent potential terms of trade effects (IMF, 2007). An increase in the
variable signals a depreciation of the home country currency vis-a`-vis the
dollar and, thus, an expected increase (decrease) in US imports (exports).
Also controlling for the influences of relative prices, we include the ratio of
home country-to-US GDP deflators (Ydefjt/Ydefit). While Gould (1994)
employs US and home country GDP deflators, separately, we follow the
methodology of Head and Ries (1998) as we believe this measure of relative
prices is better-suited, as compared to including the GDP deflators
separately, to capturing the expected positive influences of relatively higher
(lower) home country prices on US imports (exports).
Since immigrant home countries’ trade with the US may also depend on
the availability of non-US trading opportunities, we include a measure of
the economic remoteness of each home country, constructed following
Wagner et al. (2002) as REMjt ¼ 1=
PK
k¼1 Ykt=Ywtð Þ=GDjk
 
where Ywt is
gross global product and k identifies potential non-US trading partners for
country j.7 The pro-trade influences of immigrants arguably results from
recent trade liberalization or from greater trading infrastructure; for
example, access to airports, seaports, rail lines and highway systems. To
control for such possibilities, we include a measure of trade openness
(OPENjt), given as the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP (Head
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 299
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Wh
it
e,
 R
og
er
] 
At
: 
13
:2
7 
11
 J
un
e 
20
10
and Ries 1998). We also include the population of each home country
(POPjt) to serve as a proxy for market size. All monetary values, trade flows
and otherwise, wherever necessary have been normalized to constant 1995
US dollars.
We include several dummy variables in our estimation equation. As
common language has been identified as a determinant of trade flows in
gravity specifications (Dunlevy 2006; Hutchinson 2002; Girma and Yu
2002), we include a dummy variable that is equal to one if English is
commonly used in the host country (ENGj) (United States CIA 2006).
Capturing the effects of trade agreements, FTAjt is equal to one if the home
country is party to a trade agreement with the US for more than six months
during year t. To capture related geographic effects on trade, we include a
dummy variable (PORTj) that is equal to one if the home country is not
landlocked. Finally, we append a vector of time dummy variables, Ot, to our
estimation equation to ensure that contemporaneous growth in immigrant
population stocks and trade values does not distort our results. A complete
listing of variables and associated descriptive statistics is provided as
Table 1.
5. Discussion of estimation results
We estimate three variants of Equation (3). First, we estimate our empirical
model by utilizing the standard immigrant stock variable (i.e. not
differentiating refugees from non-refugee immigrants). Then we consider
variation in the immigrant–trade relationship across refugees and non-
refugee immigrants. Finally, we decompose the cultural distance variable
into its component dimensions, interact each component, separately, with
the refugee and non-refugee immigrant stock variables, and estimate our
model. To garner the economic significance of our results, we follow
Millimet and Osang (2007) and provide estimates of geodesic distance offset
per immigrant, an indication of the extent to which the pro-trade effects
immigrants may counter the cost of transportation.
5.1. Immigrants, cultural distance and US–home country trade
Results presented in Table 2 confirm the findings of prior studies. With the
single exception of when imports of non-manufactured goods are employed
as the dependent variable (column (e)), immigrants are found to exert
positive influences on US imports from and exports to their respective home
countries. The coefficients on the immigrant stock variables range in
magnitude from 0.1309 to 0.3188. Regardless of the specification used, we
also see that geodesic distance (a proxy for transport costs) acts to reduce
trade flows. As expected, the coefficient on the cultural distance variable is
negative in all estimations and is significantly different from zero when
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aggregate and manufacturing exports and imports are employed as
dependent variables. The coefficient on the term which interacts the
immigrant stock variable and the cultural distance variable is positive and
significant in all estimations except when imports of non-manufactured
goods are considered. The pattern of significance and the signs/magnitudes
of the coefficient estimates suggest that immigrants offset, at least in part,
the effects of cultural distance.
Turning to the estimated coefficients on the remaining explanatory
variables in Table 2, we observe that most coefficients bear the expected
signs. Higher GDP values for immigrants’ home countries correlate with
increased US trade. Elasticity values are near or below unity, which is
consistent with findings from prior gravity-based studies. A proxy for
market size, higher home country population is expected to be positively
related to trade flows; however, while the US tends to trade more intensively
in non-manufactured products, it trades less-intensively in manufactured
products with relatively larger population home countries. Depreciation of
immigrants’ home country currencies vis-a`-vis the US dollar correspond,
respectively, to decreases in home countries’ imports from the US, the effect
being less magnified on US imports. The ratio of home country-to-US GDP
deflators is included to control for relative prices between the US and each
home country. The positive and significant coefficients on this variable when
aggregate exports and exports of manufactured products are used as
dependent variables suggest that home countries that receive relatively
higher prices for their exports, an indication of increased competitiveness,
tend to import more from the US. Similarly, the positive and significant
coefficients on the index of trade openness indicate that the US trades more
with home countries that are relatively more open to trade. Home countries
facing relatively fewer non-US trading opportunities tend to trade more
intensively with the US. We also observe more trade between the US and
home countries that commonly use English, indicating the importance of a
shared language for facilitating transactions. Finally, the US trades more
with home countries if they are parties to trade agreements with them and
with home countries that are not landlocked.
5.2. Refugee and non-refugee immigrants, cultural distance and US trade
In Table 3, we provide results from a modified version of Equation (3),
where we distill the immigrant stock variable into refugee and non-refugee
immigrants, again interacting each with the cultural distance variable. In
Table 4, we present results from similar specification where we use both
refugee and non-refugee immigrants separately while also decomposing the
cultural distance variable into its component dimensions, SSE and TSR.
Beginning with the results presented in Table 3, we find considerable
variation in the coefficient estimates of the variables denoting immigrant
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types. Accordingly, mirroring the pattern of significance and consistency of
the magnitudes of the coefficients reported in Table 2, coefficients on the
non-refugee immigrant stock variable indicate that non-refugee immigrants
have significant pro-trade influences on US trade with their home countries.
Given the results reported in Table 2, as the large majority of immigrants to
the US did not enter the country as refugees, this result is not surprising.
Again, while negative across all estimations, the coefficients on the
cultural distance variables are significant in the regressions where aggregate
imports and exports of manufactured products are used as dependent
variables. Suggesting that non-refugee immigrants counter the trade-
inhibiting influence of cultural distance, the coefficients on the variable
that interacts the non-refugee immigrant stock with the cultural distance
variable is both positive and significant in both estimations where the
coefficients on the cultural distance variable are negative and significant.
Refugee immigrants, however, counter the inhibiting influence of cultural
distance on imports of aggregate and manufactured products. Yet, in
contrast to the proportional influences of non-refugee immigrants, the
associated estimated effects of refugees are not strong enough to yield
significant effects. Thus, while refugees do exert relatively weak, yet positive,
influences on trade, non-refugee immigrants exert much stronger influences.
This is consistent with the notion of refugees, compared with non-refugee
immigrants, being less connected to or less able to exploit, build and/or
maintain connections with partners or networks in their home countries.
Results presented in Table 4 also support the findings reported thus far,
with the coefficients on the variables representing refugees and non-refugee
immigrants following the patterns depicted in Table 3. As the results in the
table were estimated with the cultural distance variable decomposed into its
component dimensions, the results more clearly depict the influence of
cultural distance on trade. We see that, across specifications, the trade-
inhibiting effects of the cultural differences between the US and immigrant
home countries, measured along the TSR dimension are consistently
negative and significant. To the contrary, the coefficient on the cultural
distance between the US and immigrant home countries measured along the
SSE dimension is negative, yet insignificant, in all estimations except when
imports of manufactured products are employed as the dependent variable;
in which case, the coefficient is both positive and significant. This pattern is
largely consistent with the findings reported in White and Tadesse (2008),
who also report similar estimates without differentiating immigrants by their
entry classifications.
Coefficients on the terms that interact the TSR and refugee immigrant
stock variables are typically positive and significant, indicating a pro-trade
(export and import) influence of refugee immigrants that acts to offset the
influences of the TSR dimension of cultural differences between the US and
immigrants’ home countries. A similar pattern is found, albeit with
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coefficients on greater magnitude, when evaluating the role of non-refugee
immigrants in offsetting the influences of cultural differences measured along
the TSR dimension. Additionally, the coefficient estimate of the interaction
term between refugee immigrant stock variable and the SSE dimension of
cultural distance suggests that refugee immigrants offset related cultural
differences on aggregate US imports and that of manufactured goods.
However, the coefficient is negative and significant for aggregate US exports
in general and those of manufacturing goods. This implies that given their
relationship with their home countries, while refugees may act to overcome
the negative effect of cultural differences measured along the SSE dimension
in promoting US imports, their abilities to offset, fully or partially, a similar
effect of cultural differences between the US and their home countries is
constrained to an extent that the trade-inhibiting effect of the SSE
dimension of cultural difference overrides their potential contribution.
5.3. Estimated per-immigrant trade effects and geodesic distance offsets
Our results so far indicate that, albeit there are differences in the extent to
which refugee and non-refugee immigrants affect their home–host country
trade flows across different products, immigrants have pro-trade effects that
also partially offset the trade-inhibiting effect of cultural distances, whether
measured along combined or separate dimensions, while geodesic distance
significantly reduces the amount of trade taking place. In order to garner a
better understanding of the economic significance of the observed
proportional pro-trade effect of each class of immigrants reported, in this
section, we follow Millimet and Osang (2007) and estimate the extent to
which immigrants may offset the amount of trade that would be lost due to
the geodesic distance (and thus, transportation costs) between the US and
immigrant home countries.8
Table 5 presents the estimated distance offset based on significant
coefficients reported in Tables 2 through 4. When using coefficients on
immigrant stock variables where we do not differentiate between refugee
and non-refugee immigrants, we derive the per-immigrant distance offset,
measured in kilometers, as GD exp l1=g1ð Þ  ln IM= IMþ 1ð Þ½  þf
l2=g1ð Þ  lnCD ln IM= IMþ 1ð Þ½   1g.9 When we decompose the im-
migrant stock variable into refugee and non-refugee immigrants, we modify
the derivation of the distance offset accordingly. Dividing the average
geodesic distance between the US and a typical immigrant’s home country in
our data, 8271 km, by the estimated distance offset per immigrant produces a
further estimate of the number of immigrants necessary to completely
counteract the negative effect of geodesic distance (transport costs) on trade
between the US and the typical immigrant’s home country. While our
estimation method assumes constant returns to immigration, we understand
that the pro-trade effect of immigrants may not be proportional to the size of
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the immigrant population. Thus, although our estimates might be exagger-
ated, the estimates do provide an indication of the relative strength of
immigrant–trade links across the different trade measures and immigrant
types.
Focusing first on the effect of immigrants, generally speaking, in
offsetting the negative effect of geodesic distance on trade, the estimates
indicate that the extent to which a typical immigrant counters the negative
effect of geodesic distance on US exports to – and imports from – her home
country varies by 452 meters and 176 meters, respectively. Given that these
values are estimates of the amount of geographic distance that a typical
immigrant offsets for transporting the average US exports or imports in a
given year to the immigrant’s home country, it is straightforward to infer the
substantial economic significance of the pro-trade effect of immigrants.
Using these estimates as a benchmark, we find that fully offsetting the effect
of transport costs on US exports to a typical home country requires an
additional 18,317 immigrants from that home country, while a greater
number of immigrants, 46,887, is required to completely offset the transport
costs associated with US imports.
The asymmetry in the distances offset indicates that the extent to which
immigrants are capable of offsetting the cost of transportation on US exports
to their home countries tends to outweigh the extent to which they can
influence the cost of transportation on US imports from their home countries.
If the pro-import effect of immigrants is largely due to their ‘transplanted
home bias’ preferences and the pro-export influence is driven by their ‘cultural’
and ‘enforcement’ bridge effects, the observed ability of immigrants to offset a
greater geodesic distance for exports than imports would not be surprising.
Similarly, comparing the effects across product categories, we find that the
extent to which immigrants can offset the costs of transportation on US trade
with their home countries is generally greater for manufactured products than
for non-manufactured products, plausibly because of differences in the
bulkiness of products in the latter category or complexities associated with
standardization of different goods and thus differences in the ability of
immigrants to offset the associated cost of transportation across different
products. Lastly, distilling the immigrant stock variable into refugee and non-
refugee stocks, along with decomposition of the cultural distance variable into
its component dimensions, reveals that while non-refugee immigrants typically
offset a significant and large amount of the cost of transportation on US trade
with their home countries, refugee immigrants are estimated to exert weaker
effects in terms of offsetting distance.
6. Concluding comments
Prior studies of the immigrant–trade relationship provide a general
understanding of the role that immigrants play in enhancing trade between
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their host and home countries. Although, historically, the US has accepted
relatively diverse and large numbers of refugee and non-refugee immigrants
alike, whether or not the effect of immigrants on US–home country trade
varies across immigrants’ entry classifications has not been examined.
Employing data that span the years 1996–2001 for the US and 59 home
countries, we provide the first examination of variation in the US
immigrant–trade link across immigrant entry classifications. Our results
indicate that immigrants generally exert positive influences on US trade with
their home countries; however, the influence of refugees, while positive, is of
considerably lesser magnitude as compared with that of non-refugee
immigrants. Furthermore, for both immigrant types, our results indicate
that immigrants offset the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural distance, a
measure of cultural and institutional dissimilarity between the US and
immigrants’ home countries, with the related effects of non-refugee
immigrants being stronger than those of refugee immigrants.
The relatively weak influences of refugee immigrants on US trade with
their home countries may be the result of such immigrants having more
tenuous ties to their home countries relative to the ties of non-refugee
immigrants. Moreover, constraints on refugees’ abilities to maintain/foster
connections with home country-based trading partners would correspond to
a diminished likelihood of refugees increasing US exports via either the
cultural or enforcement bridges. Similarly, as refugee immigrants have
limited connections to their home country business and/or social networks,
they are also less influential in promoting their host countries exports to
their home countries. Finally, that the pro-import influence of refugee
immigrants is of low magnitude may be the result of a transplanted home
bias effect that is not found in conjunction with an information bridge or
network effect. While the findings presented here clearly suggest the
existence of differences in the extent to which refugee and non-refugee
immigrants affect US–home country trade, they also suggest the need for
additional research, using more disaggregated trade measures while
considering more detailed immigrant characteristics that we cannot account
for. Although we have treated all immigrants as being equally capable of
influencing trade flows, some immigrants may be better-equipped, in terms
of education and their human capital levels or access to host country
networks resulting from occupational choice, etc., to exert pro-trade effects
than are other immigrants. Likewise, as immigrants’ assimilation may affect
their abilities to influence host–home country trade flows, it is reasonable to
expect that the ability of immigrants to influence host–home country trade
varies based on the length of time that immigrants (refugees and non-
refugees, alike) have resided in the US. Given the data we employ, we are
unable to control for the durations of immigrants’ stays in the US. Thus,
further exploration of the immigrant–trade relationship that affords a
greater emphasis on these and other immigrant characteristics is merited.
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Notes
1. Other important pieces of legislation that influenced the level and composition of
both total immigrant inflows and refugee/asylee inflows during this period
include the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, the Migration and Refugee Assistance
Act of 1962 and the Refugee Act of 1980.
2. Tinbergen (1962) first applies the gravity specification to trade, and more recent
research has established theoretical foundations for the model. See, for example,
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004).
3. Detailed information regarding the WVS/EVS, including a description of the
data collection methodology and additional country-specific examples can be
found at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. While the WVS/EVS provides data for 81
countries, incomplete data restricts our sample to only 59 nations. A listing of
the nations in our data set is provided in the appendix.
4. On average, the Values Surveys provide TSR and SSE values for 1190 residents
of each nation in our sample. For the US, 1117 residents were surveyed. Mean
values are un-weighted arithmetic averages.
5. Estimated cultural distances depicted in Figure 1 and all other data used in this
study are available upon request.
6. Unless noted, data for explanatory variables are from the World Bank (2006).
7. Internal distance, when k ¼ j, is derived as 0:4 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiLandMassjp (Head andMayer,
2000).
8. Using the Iceberg trade model, these estimates indicate the reduction in the cost
of transporting goods to and from the immigrants’ home countries that is
attributable to the presence of each type of immigrant in the US.
9. Since geodesic distance is measured in kilometers, multiplying the resulting offset
estimates by 1000 converts the estimates into meters of geodesic distance offset
by a typical immigrant.
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Appendix. Country listing, with estimated refugee/asylee and other immigrant stocks.
Country
Avg.
Refugee/
Asylee
stock
Avg. Non-
Refugee
Immigrant
stock Country
Avg.
Refugee/
Asylee
stock
Avg. Non-
Refugee
Immigrant
stock
Albania 12,181 17,640 Jordan 26 46,808
Algeria 51 10,770 Korea, Rep. 4,624 812,085
Argentina 107 122,675 Latvia 24,619 2,105
Australia 24 58,696 Luxembourg 0 2,114
Austria 25,672 37,341 Mexico 451 8,360,978
Bangladesh 0 77,359 Morocco 20 29,645
Belgium 110 33,888 Netherlands 21,445 73,567
Brazil 32 165,119 New Zealand 6 21,830
Bulgaria 8,989 17,210 Nigeria 859 121,291
Canada 157 794,709 Norway 15 31,940
Chile 1,146 77,119 Pakistan 30 197,572
China 42,123 983,489 Peru 500 264,958
Colombia 720 466,332 Philippines 211 1,333,326
Denmark 0 31,623 Poland 164,170 311,420
Dominican Rep. 105 669,441 Portugal 3,977 198,433
Egypt 7,119 98,588 Romania 55,330 87,055
El Salvador 3,430 789,894 Russian Fed. 211,979 165,594
Estonia 9,269 226 South Africa 830 57,272
Finland 11 21,438 Spain 8,565 74,267
France 657 145,598 Sweden 4 49,785
Germany 147,505 560,980 Switzerland 9 44,340
Greece 19,908 147,970 Tanzania 0 10,085
Hungary 54,715 38,024 Turkey 5,867 69,221
Iceland 0 5,356 Uganda 1,336 9,877
India 8 880,765 UK 381 659,036
Indonesia 18,371 51,315 Uruguay 53 25,164
Ireland 18 161,331 Venezuela 837 83,411
Israel 82 109,353 Vietnam 584,511 611,557
Italy 66,404 410,140 Zimbabwe 134 7,358
Japan 9,965 330,723
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